I would strongly suggest that the LD second place in both Cities of London & Westminster and Finnchley & Golders Green were aberrations, and that in reality Labour will be the main challenger to the Tories in those seats in 2024. Historically that has been the case. Wimbledon also could reasonably be viewed as a three-way contest.
I think this is possible on both Cities and Finchley, but I also think it is unwise to attempt to second guess individual seats. The truth is both are currently Con-LD contests - that is what voters will see if they look up the last result, and will definitely be what they see on Lib Dem leaflets. Wimbledon strikes me as definitely a Con-LD marginal now whatever its history - the result last time was very close! And there are plenty of other Con-LD seats nearby to it so it is hardly an aberration in that respect in that part of London.
There were clear local factors in play in both Cities and Finchley - with the LD candidates being prominent Labour defectors plus the anti-Semitic row playing badly in the latter. I doubt that the LDs will target either seat.. Wimbledon is different , but even there the Labour vote may well have been artificially depressed in 2019 by the Brexit and Corbyn factors. Labour might have potential to recover more strongly there - and no particular evidence of further LD progress there in Local Elections. Labour vote was strong in 2017 and could prove very sticky.
Sutton Carshalton & Wallington seat could also be interesting given that Tom Brake is not standing again . This had been a Tory/Labour marginal in the 1970s until the Alliance gained second place in 1983. Possibly some potential for a Portsmouth South type revival!
Not really sure that's true on Wimbledon and LDs - the Lib Dem vote in Merton was up sharply in 2022, and they made 11 gains on the council, most of those on wards in the Wimbledon area. They won all the seats in West Barnes, Wimbledon Park and Wimbledon Town ward, among others https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Merton_London_Borough_Council_election
As for Carshalton and Wallington, I can't see any chance of Labour making a play for a seat where they start at 12% and have been 3rd since the seat's inception in 1983. Tom Brake no doubt had a substantial personal vote, but LDs will be very disappointed not to retake it, as it would require only a very small swing. Con decline alone should deliver it as a gain.
The seat formed in 1983 was almost identical to the Carshalton seat which preceded it. I recall the latter seat created prior to the February 1974 election following boundary changes which persuaded Robert Carr to move there from the Mitcham seat he had held since 1950. It was then seen as a Tory/Labour marginal - though Carr prevailed with a 5700 majority in February which fell to 3,700 in October 1974. For some reason Labour failed to regain second place after coming third in 1983 - though the party polled 24% in 1997.Tactical voting in recent elections has almost certainly suppressed the underlying vote in the area, but when the LDs eventually lose a seat - as happened here in 2019 - much of that tactical vote can unwind. In Portsmouth South Labour went from less than 14% in 2010 to almost 49% in 2019. I suspect the potential is there for a Labour revival.
Earlier examples come to mind. Eric Lubbock lost Orpington narrowly in 1970- yet despite the Liberal surge under Thorpe the party failed to win it back in 1974.
I'm not sure "thos seat was a marginal in the 1970s" is going to be a strong argument for resources in an election where Labour's already going to be spread very thin. It is true seats can and do change over time, but I'd bet against it in the case of Carshalton. Too Con-LD, for too long, IMO.
I was referring to the LD vote share in 2022. No real sign of momentum building on the 2019 GE result - and when account is taken of the tendency for the party to outperform at local v parliamentary elections their success at the 2024 GE is far from certain. Labour would be foolish to abandon a seat the party held 1997 - 2005 and where it performed well in 2017.
I disagree. Labour would be foolish to spend much time and energy on a seat where they are third, LDs are dominant in relevant local council wards, and are within 650 votes of victory. There are plenty of better Labour targets nearby.
This seems rather disingenuous. As usual, professional pundits overestimate or overstate the likely effect of tactical voting. Primarily because they overlook the extent to which the 'base' figures (based on uniform swing) already include a significant amount of tactical voting at the previous election. The purported effects of tactical voting are really projections of an INCREASED level of tactical voting over and above that already included in the base figures. And there must be limits to the plausible extent of increased levels of tactical voting at both the upper and lower bounds. The 'upper bound' being the limit at which voters in a particular constituency are unlikely to vote tactically because they don't see any realistic likelihood of a vote for their second-choice party being sufficient to displace the incumbent. The 'lower bound'being where the 3rd or 4th placed party vote has already been squeezed so far that the only remaining voters for that party (from the previous election) are those who will insist on voting for a 'lost cause' and refuse to vote tactically for a 2nd-preference candidate under almost any circumstances.
In simple terms, for Labour to achieve an effective overall majority, they would need to gain approximately 100 seats from Conservatives and a further 15 from SNP. Or, to put it another way, roughly speaking, all the seats which they lost in 2019, plus any others where in 2019 they came 2nd and within 10,000 votes of the incumbent MP. They might or might not achieve the necessary swing to achieve that goal (based on current voting intention polling it would be too close to call). But, in any event, its extremely unlikely that any plausible increased level of tactical voting over and above that already in effect in the 2019 election would tip the balance.
Of the top 12 seats listed as most likely to be susceptible to increased LD > Lab tactical voting, I would suggest that 10 would likely fall to Labour anyway. And the other two (Bromley and NE Somerset) would likely remain Conservative. 2 or 3 of the next few seats on that list (Basingstoke, Banbury & Beckenham) would be the only constituencies which I would estimate likely to be susceptible to Labour gains due to increased levels of LD > Labour tactical voting.
In addition, before we leave the Con/Lab marginals, 2 seats further down the suggested likely list of those susceptible to increased tactical voting (Blackpool North and Great Grimsby), I would also estimate as likely Labour gains, irrespective of the actions of 2019 Lib Dem voters. These two seats are extreme examples of where the LD vote has already been squeezed so hard that there is highly unlikely to be anything substantial enough left in 3rd party votes to make a difference to the 2024 result. Albeit those Blackpool North numbers possibly moot, due to significant boundary changes.
The list of possible additional Lib Dem gains due to increased Labour > LD tactical voting seems rather more plausible. That is despite the methodology used to arrive at that conclusion being worse than dubious. There is no rational foundation at all to suppose that a (reasonable overall estimate) 10% Con > Lab swing should convert to a 5% swing to LD in constituencies where they currently place second. That might plausibly happen as a result of Lab > LD tactical voting -- but to present that as a 'starting point' for likely FURTHER tactical voting is rather like having your cake and eating it. It smacks of the scientist deliberately modifying the rules of the experiment in order to 'prove' his pet theory.
A better formula / methodology might be,: Instead of assuming a 'flat' uniform swing of 10% Con > Lab (regardless of existing/previous vote shares) -- to hypothesize a 'uniform' (base starting point) reduction of 25% in the Conservative 2019 vote and a uniform increase of 30% in the 2019 Labour vote. With no change, at this point, to the 2019 LD vote.
[Using this formula of Con -25% and Lab +30% rather than simple 10% swing is also how I got the additional 10 likely Lab gains not subject to increased tactical voting.]
That could result in 2 further seats (Hitchin & Harpenden and Wokingham) falling to Lib Dems, solely due to the Con > Lab swing. Against that, 3 'central' London seats (Finchley, Westminster and Chelsea) have to be considered as 3-way marginals. The slightly more sophisticated suggested version of the Con > Lab swing would be sufficient to push Labour ahead of Lib Dems into 2nd place in each of these constituencies. And any attempt by voters to be 'clever' by voting tactically there would be at least as likely to be counter-productive as to achieve the intended result.
The remaining 13 seats suggested are all then more or less plausible LD gains due to increased Lab > LD tactical voting to different degrees. Although I would group and order them rather differently in terms of likelihood, thus:
Highly plausible:
1. Wells
2. SW Surrey
3. Taunton Deane
4. Brecon
5. Harrogate
Possible:
6. Chippenham
7. Romsey
8. Sutton & Cheam
9. Wantage
10. SE Cambs
11. Woking
Unlikely:
12/13 Totnes & Witney
The reason for the different ordering of likelihood/feasibility is the proposition that its not simply the additional percentage of 3rd-place votes necessary to achieve an unseating that matters. Its easy enough to envisage 50% of a 3rd-place party's votes tactically transferring to the second-place party in the right circumstances. At least as important as that is the perception in a potential tactical voter's mind as to how likely such a switch of vote would be to make the desired difference. That might reasonably be measured in terms of the ratio of projected 2nd-place votes to projected 3rd-place votes. I opted for an arbitrary cut-off value of 2.5 to 1 (after taking account of revised 'uniform' swing) as the point beyond which enough additional natural Labour supporters might consider tactically voting Lib Dem in distinguishing 'likely' vs 'unlikely' tactical gains.
Yes, there is! Wimbledon has such a small majority that it falls to LDs on even a small swing against Cons. Tactical voting would help boost an incoming LD MP's majority, but it is unlikely to decide the result if there is any substantial national swing against Cons.
I would strongly suggest that the LD second place in both Cities of London & Westminster and Finnchley & Golders Green were aberrations, and that in reality Labour will be the main challenger to the Tories in those seats in 2024. Historically that has been the case. Wimbledon also could reasonably be viewed as a three-way contest.
I think this is possible on both Cities and Finchley, but I also think it is unwise to attempt to second guess individual seats. The truth is both are currently Con-LD contests - that is what voters will see if they look up the last result, and will definitely be what they see on Lib Dem leaflets. Wimbledon strikes me as definitely a Con-LD marginal now whatever its history - the result last time was very close! And there are plenty of other Con-LD seats nearby to it so it is hardly an aberration in that respect in that part of London.
There were clear local factors in play in both Cities and Finchley - with the LD candidates being prominent Labour defectors plus the anti-Semitic row playing badly in the latter. I doubt that the LDs will target either seat.. Wimbledon is different , but even there the Labour vote may well have been artificially depressed in 2019 by the Brexit and Corbyn factors. Labour might have potential to recover more strongly there - and no particular evidence of further LD progress there in Local Elections. Labour vote was strong in 2017 and could prove very sticky.
Sutton Carshalton & Wallington seat could also be interesting given that Tom Brake is not standing again . This had been a Tory/Labour marginal in the 1970s until the Alliance gained second place in 1983. Possibly some potential for a Portsmouth South type revival!
Not really sure that's true on Wimbledon and LDs - the Lib Dem vote in Merton was up sharply in 2022, and they made 11 gains on the council, most of those on wards in the Wimbledon area. They won all the seats in West Barnes, Wimbledon Park and Wimbledon Town ward, among others https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Merton_London_Borough_Council_election
As for Carshalton and Wallington, I can't see any chance of Labour making a play for a seat where they start at 12% and have been 3rd since the seat's inception in 1983. Tom Brake no doubt had a substantial personal vote, but LDs will be very disappointed not to retake it, as it would require only a very small swing. Con decline alone should deliver it as a gain.
The seat formed in 1983 was almost identical to the Carshalton seat which preceded it. I recall the latter seat created prior to the February 1974 election following boundary changes which persuaded Robert Carr to move there from the Mitcham seat he had held since 1950. It was then seen as a Tory/Labour marginal - though Carr prevailed with a 5700 majority in February which fell to 3,700 in October 1974. For some reason Labour failed to regain second place after coming third in 1983 - though the party polled 24% in 1997.Tactical voting in recent elections has almost certainly suppressed the underlying vote in the area, but when the LDs eventually lose a seat - as happened here in 2019 - much of that tactical vote can unwind. In Portsmouth South Labour went from less than 14% in 2010 to almost 49% in 2019. I suspect the potential is there for a Labour revival.
Earlier examples come to mind. Eric Lubbock lost Orpington narrowly in 1970- yet despite the Liberal surge under Thorpe the party failed to win it back in 1974.
I'm not sure "thos seat was a marginal in the 1970s" is going to be a strong argument for resources in an election where Labour's already going to be spread very thin. It is true seats can and do change over time, but I'd bet against it in the case of Carshalton. Too Con-LD, for too long, IMO.
I was referring to the LD vote share in 2022. No real sign of momentum building on the 2019 GE result - and when account is taken of the tendency for the party to outperform at local v parliamentary elections their success at the 2024 GE is far from certain. Labour would be foolish to abandon a seat the party held 1997 - 2005 and where it performed well in 2017.
I disagree. Labour would be foolish to spend much time and energy on a seat where they are third, LDs are dominant in relevant local council wards, and are within 650 votes of victory. There are plenty of better Labour targets nearby.
On that basis, labour would not have made much effort in seats such as Conway - Hastings & Rye - and Falmouth & Camborne in 1997.
This seems rather disingenuous. As usual, professional pundits overestimate or overstate the likely effect of tactical voting. Primarily because they overlook the extent to which the 'base' figures (based on uniform swing) already include a significant amount of tactical voting at the previous election. The purported effects of tactical voting are really projections of an INCREASED level of tactical voting over and above that already included in the base figures. And there must be limits to the plausible extent of increased levels of tactical voting at both the upper and lower bounds. The 'upper bound' being the limit at which voters in a particular constituency are unlikely to vote tactically because they don't see any realistic likelihood of a vote for their second-choice party being sufficient to displace the incumbent. The 'lower bound'being where the 3rd or 4th placed party vote has already been squeezed so far that the only remaining voters for that party (from the previous election) are those who will insist on voting for a 'lost cause' and refuse to vote tactically for a 2nd-preference candidate under almost any circumstances.
In simple terms, for Labour to achieve an effective overall majority, they would need to gain approximately 100 seats from Conservatives and a further 15 from SNP. Or, to put it another way, roughly speaking, all the seats which they lost in 2019, plus any others where in 2019 they came 2nd and within 10,000 votes of the incumbent MP. They might or might not achieve the necessary swing to achieve that goal (based on current voting intention polling it would be too close to call). But, in any event, its extremely unlikely that any plausible increased level of tactical voting over and above that already in effect in the 2019 election would tip the balance.
Of the top 12 seats listed as most likely to be susceptible to increased LD > Lab tactical voting, I would suggest that 10 would likely fall to Labour anyway. And the other two (Bromley and NE Somerset) would likely remain Conservative. 2 or 3 of the next few seats on that list (Basingstoke, Banbury & Beckenham) would be the only constituencies which I would estimate likely to be susceptible to Labour gains due to increased levels of LD > Labour tactical voting.
In addition, before we leave the Con/Lab marginals, 2 seats further down the suggested likely list of those susceptible to increased tactical voting (Blackpool North and Great Grimsby), I would also estimate as likely Labour gains, irrespective of the actions of 2019 Lib Dem voters. These two seats are extreme examples of where the LD vote has already been squeezed so hard that there is highly unlikely to be anything substantial enough left in 3rd party votes to make a difference to the 2024 result. Albeit those Blackpool North numbers possibly moot, due to significant boundary changes.
The list of possible additional Lib Dem gains due to increased Labour > LD tactical voting seems rather more plausible. That is despite the methodology used to arrive at that conclusion being worse than dubious. There is no rational foundation at all to suppose that a (reasonable overall estimate) 10% Con > Lab swing should convert to a 5% swing to LD in constituencies where they currently place second. That might plausibly happen as a result of Lab > LD tactical voting -- but to present that as a 'starting point' for likely FURTHER tactical voting is rather like having your cake and eating it. It smacks of the scientist deliberately modifying the rules of the experiment in order to 'prove' his pet theory.
A better formula / methodology might be,: Instead of assuming a 'flat' uniform swing of 10% Con > Lab (regardless of existing/previous vote shares) -- to hypothesize a 'uniform' (base starting point) reduction of 25% in the Conservative 2019 vote and a uniform increase of 30% in the 2019 Labour vote. With no change, at this point, to the 2019 LD vote.
[Using this formula of Con -25% and Lab +30% rather than simple 10% swing is also how I got the additional 10 likely Lab gains not subject to increased tactical voting.]
That could result in 2 further seats (Hitchin & Harpenden and Wokingham) falling to Lib Dems, solely due to the Con > Lab swing. Against that, 3 'central' London seats (Finchley, Westminster and Chelsea) have to be considered as 3-way marginals. The slightly more sophisticated suggested version of the Con > Lab swing would be sufficient to push Labour ahead of Lib Dems into 2nd place in each of these constituencies. And any attempt by voters to be 'clever' by voting tactically there would be at least as likely to be counter-productive as to achieve the intended result.
The remaining 13 seats suggested are all then more or less plausible LD gains due to increased Lab > LD tactical voting to different degrees. Although I would group and order them rather differently in terms of likelihood, thus:
Highly plausible:
1. Wells
2. SW Surrey
3. Taunton Deane
4. Brecon
5. Harrogate
Possible:
6. Chippenham
7. Romsey
8. Sutton & Cheam
9. Wantage
10. SE Cambs
11. Woking
Unlikely:
12/13 Totnes & Witney
The reason for the different ordering of likelihood/feasibility is the proposition that its not simply the additional percentage of 3rd-place votes necessary to achieve an unseating that matters. Its easy enough to envisage 50% of a 3rd-place party's votes tactically transferring to the second-place party in the right circumstances. At least as important as that is the perception in a potential tactical voter's mind as to how likely such a switch of vote would be to make the desired difference. That might reasonably be measured in terms of the ratio of projected 2nd-place votes to projected 3rd-place votes. I opted for an arbitrary cut-off value of 2.5 to 1 (after taking account of revised 'uniform' swing) as the point beyond which enough additional natural Labour supporters might consider tactically voting Lib Dem in distinguishing 'likely' vs 'unlikely' tactical gains.
Is there any way of getting this analysis into the heads of Keir Starmer, Labour MPs, councillors, campaign leaders and activists?
Rob, avid reader of your work. I notice Wimbledon isn't included, is there a particular reason for this?
Yes, there is! Wimbledon has such a small majority that it falls to LDs on even a small swing against Cons. Tactical voting would help boost an incoming LD MP's majority, but it is unlikely to decide the result if there is any substantial national swing against Cons.